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SKEPTICISM AND EXPERTISE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE EEOC
Melissa Hart*

In the area of federal antidiscrimination law, the U.S. Supreme Court
often prefers to "chart its own course" rather than to defer to Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" of "Commission")
regulations and guidance interpreting these laws. As Justice John Paul
Stevens has recognized, the course the Court takes in these instances sadly
reflects a "crabbed vision" of antidiscrimination laws. 1
To some extent, the Court's lack of deference to the EEOC is part of a
broader picture: The Court has established a bifurcated structure of
administrative deference that leaves much of the kind of interpretation that
the EEOC most often engages in with the "power to persuade" but not the
"power to control."'2 But an examination of decisions interpreting Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), reveals that even within this framework the EEOC receives
remarkably little respect from the Court. What explains this lack of
respect? Some have suggested that more careful work on the part of the
EEOC would lead to greater deference from the Court. 3 Others have
suggested that the particularly political nature of the subject matter dealt
with by the Commission leads to a judicial reluctance to cede any authority
in this area. 4 This Essay explores two further possibilities: first, that
members of the Supreme Court do not view the EEOC as a repository of
valuable expert knowledge on the subject of discrimination, and second,
that some members of the Court are suspicious of the agency's agenda.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. Law Clerk for Justice
John Paul Stevens, October Term 1996. I am grateful to participants in the conference on
the Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens and at a University of Colorado workshop and to Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Emily Calhoun, Nestor Davidson, Clare Huntington, Martin Katz, Nantiya
Ruan, Catherine Smith, Mark Squillace, Kevin Traskos, Phil Weiser, and Rebecca Hanner
White for their helpful comments. Thanks to Michael Wall and Celene Sheppard for
excellent research assistance.
1. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 513 (1999) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
2. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
3. See, e.g., Theodore W. Wern, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretationsof the
Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second-Class Agency?, 60 Ohio

St. L.J. 1533, 1574 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and DisabilityDiscrimination,99 Mich.
L. Rev. 532, 571 (2000) ("In the sensitive area of race or sex discrimination, the Supreme
Court may be unwilling to defer to an agency interpretation with which it disagrees.").
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This Essay begins in Part I by examining the Court's approach to
deference in the context of EEOC interpretation of the statutes that agency
enforces. This inquiry reveals that the Court has consistently refused to
define what level of deference the agency's regulations are owed, preferring
to retain a broad and undefined discretion to accept or reject agency
analysis. Further, when the Court does apply a settled deference standard, it
more often than not finds the EEOC's interpretation unpersuasive. Part II
argues that the Court is making a mistake by refusing to respect the EEOC's
interpretation of the statutes it has been charged with enforcing, and I offer
some possible explanations for the Court's insistence on retaining broad
discretion in this area. Some of the Court's attitude may stem from its
perception of where expertise in discrimination does and does not reside.
To some extent, the Court may assume that discrimination is not a topic
susceptible to the development of expertise, and therefore that the reasons
for deferring to administrative agencies do not particularly apply in
employment discrimination cases. Further, the Court may perceive itself as
having a certain expertise in defining and recognizing discrimination as a
consequence of its role in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it may therefore be unwilling to relinquish
control of this area.
The Court's reluctance to defer to EEOC
interpretations may also reflect a broader skepticism about the scope of the
problem of discrimination and the appropriateness of empowering a federal
agency to define the problem and its possible solutions.
This Essay concludes that Justice Stevens's opinions-both for the Court
and in dissent-present a more appealing vision of the EEOC's role in
developing federal employment discrimination law than do the Court's
other opinions. On the one hand, Justice Stevens is a central architect and
supporter of the Court's framework for deference to agency interpretation,
including the view that much EEOC interpretation is entitled to lesser
deference than other kinds of agency action. On the other hand, he has
frequently dissented from the Court's opinions rejecting EEOC
interpretations. His adherence to a formal system that accords greater
deference to agency regulations with the force of law than to those that lack
binding authority is tempered by respect for the EEOC's expertise. In
contrast to the Court's cramped vision, Justice Stevens's respect for the
EEOC leads to interpretations of the federal antidiscrimination statutes that
give these laws the full remedial scope Congress intended.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S RELUCTANCE TO DEFER TO THE

EEOC

In a number of relatively recent opinions, the Court has articulated a
basic structure for evaluating the deference due an agency's regulations and
interpretations under the statute it is responsible for implementing. 5 This
5. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). The Court's approach to administrative deference has been
the topic of numerous articles, and I will not seek here to explore all of the intricacies and
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framework is intended to apply to judicial review of the legal interpretation
undertaken by all of the federal agencies, regardless of the subject matter
within their particular jurisdiction. It draws distinctions based on the
agency's legal authority to issue the interpretation and on the form that the
interpretation takes. Despite this formal content neutrality, however, the
Court's attitude towards the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, the ADA,
and the ADEA reveals that substantive context matters quite a lot. When
considering the question of deference in the specific context of federal
antidiscrimination law, the Court tends either to avoid the question of what
deference is due, or to refuse deference to the EEOC under any standard.
Some aspects of the Court's approach can be explained as a content-neutral
application of the administrative deference framework it has created. The
EEOC's interpretations most often take a form that leads to application of a
less deferential standard. But the choice of a particular standard of
deference does not explain all of the Court's lack of respect for EEOC
interpretation. Indeed, the Court's opinions in this area suggest that the
particular standard of administrative deference is less important than the
way in which that standard is applied.
A. Deference in Theory: A Framework
As Justice Stevens explained in Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, the Court "[has] long recognized that
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer." 6 The
particular weight to be given to the agency's interpretation, however, will
vary depending upon a number of factors. Specifically, the extent of
congressional delegation to the agency, the form the agency's interpretation
takes, and the procedural rigor that attends the agency's interpretation, will
all affect the extent of judicial deference to the agency's view.
The most deferential review standard, set forth in Chevron, requires a
court to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of the law when the
language of a statute does not clearly answer the question at hand.7 Under
Chevron's two-step analysis, a court must first determine "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 8 If so, then
the court must effectuate the legislative command. If, however, the statute
is silent or ambiguous on the particular question, the Court should
determine whether the agency's position "is based on a permissible
open questions in this field. For excellent discussions of the subject, see Robert A. Anthony,
Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal

Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E.Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The OriginalConvention, 116

Harv. L. Rev. 467 (2002); Amy J.Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen:
What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1877 (2006).
6. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
7. Id. at 842-43.
8. Id. at 842.
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construction of the statute." 9 If the agency's position is reasonable, the
court must defer to that position, even if it is not the one the court itself
might have chosen. Recently, the Court has made clear that Chevron
deference should be applied only "when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority."' 10 The surest sign that Chevron deference is
warranted is an explicit congressional authorization to the agency to engage
in rulemaking or adjudication, but "some other indication of comparable
congressional intent" may be sufficient."1 The majority of cases in which
the Supreme Court has applied Chevron have involved notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication. While the Court has suggested that
Chevron may apply to other kinds of agency action, 12 it remains unclear to
13
what extent the doctrine applies in any other contexts.
The Court still accords some respect to agency interpretations that do not
receive Chevron deference, "but only to the extent that those interpretations
have the 'power to persuade."1 4 This less deferential standard rests on the
notion that an agency's views "constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment" and that courts should in appropriate cases defer to that
expertise. 15 As Justice Robert H. Jackson first explained it in an oftenquoted passage in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., "[t]he weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to

9. Id. at 843.
10. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
11. Id. at 227; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("Sometimes the legislative delegation

to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
12. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
13. In his opinion for the Court in INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421 (1987), Justice
John Paul Stevens suggested a further wrinkle to Chevron when he observed that courts need
not defer to agency interpretation when the matter at issue is "a pure question of statutory
construction." Id. at 446. In such a case, Justice Stevens argued, courts are entirely equipped
to conduct the interpretive exercise using their traditional skills of statutory exegesis.
Deference to agencies is reserved for circumstances involving a regulatory gap or casespecific application of a statutory term. Id. at 448. The precise scope of this limitation is
very unclear, and it appears to be a refinement of Chevron that has been somewhat ignored
both in the courts and among scholars.
14. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
15. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?:
Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin.
L. Rev. 735, 740 (2002); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices,and the ParadoxofDeference:
A PreliminaryInquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501, 505
(2005); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference:
Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the

Architecture of Chevron, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1105, 1127-28 (noting that the Skidmore
factors are "designed to assess the relative decisionmaking capacity of the agency vis-A-vis
the reviewing court").
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persuade, if lacking power to control."' 16 The Court applies this Skidmore
standard in reviewing a wide variety of agency interpretations, ranging from
opinion letters addressed to specific disputes to more generally applicable
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines. 17 Because
agencies publish these less formal statements more often than they do
statements through notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication, the
"weaker deference" of Skidmore applies significantly more often than the
stronger Chevron deference. 18 But simply saying that Skidmore deference
is applicable tells us very little about the level of actual respect an agency's
views will receive. As the Court recently recognized, "[t]he approach has
produced a spectrum of judicial19 responses, from great respect at one end, to
near indifference at the other."'
B. Deference in Practice: The Court's Treatment of the EEOC
The EEOC was created in 1964 with the enactment of Title VII, and its
jurisdiction now extends over all of the federal statutes that prohibit
discrimination in employment. 20 Among other laws, the agency has
primary enforcement authority over Title VII, the ADEA, and Title I of the
ADA. 2 1 Each of these statutes contains slightly different language about
the agency's authority to fill in gaps left by Congress in these contentious
federal laws. In Title VII, the only explicit delegation of rulemaking
authority directs the Commission to issue "suitable procedural regulations
to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." 22 By contrast, the ADEA
does not limit the agency to "procedural regulations," but broadly
authorizes the EEOC to "issue such rules and regulations as it may consider
necessary or appropriate for carrying out this chapter." 23 And the explicit
terms of the ADA required the EEOC to issue regulations to carry out Title
I (the employment provisions) within one year of the date of the statute's
24
enactment.

16. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.

17. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.9 (2003);
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995).
18. See Rossi, supra note 15, at 1109-10.
19. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citations omitted); see also Colin S. Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 565 (1985) (stating that
Skidmore is "nothing more than 'respectful or courteous regard'); Rossi, supra note 15 at
1109 ("Skidmore is commonly understood to be 'weak deference."').
20. See Laws Enforced by the EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/policy/laws.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2006).
21. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-12 (2000);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12. Title VII does not require the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") EEOC to use notice-and-comment procedures in
issuing its regulations. See Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 n.7 (2002).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 628.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
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The EEOC exercises this delegated authority in some instances to
25
promulgate regulations through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
However, in addition to regulations promulgated through these relatively
formal processes, the EEOC issues a dizzying array of arguably less formal
27
documents including enforcement guidance, 2 6 interpretive guidance,
policy guidance, 28 policy statements, technical assistance manuals, 29 and
compliance manuals. 30
Because the agency does so much of its
interpretation of federal antidiscrimination law through these less formal
mechanisms, it is unsurprising that the Court reviews the EEOC's
interpretations under Skidmore more often than under Chevron.3 1 But an
examination of the Court's approach towards the EEOC interpretation
shows a more complicated picture--one that cannot be explained only by
reference to the dictates of the Court's formal deference framework.
Much of the time, whether it agrees with the agency or not, the Court has
simply declined to decide what standard of deference it should apply to an
EEOC interpretation, even when the interpretation at issue is made pursuant
to the agency's explicitly delegated authority. For example, in Edelman v.
Lynchburg College,32 the Court considered the validity of an EEOC
regulation that seemed quite clearly to be the type of "procedural
regulation" Congress explicitly authorized the agency to enact under Title
VII. 33 The regulation provided that if a charge of discrimination is timely
filed with the EEOC but it is not verified by oath and affirmation, the
charge can be amended later with the required verification, and the
verification will relate back to the time of initially filing. 34 Justice David
Souter, writing for the majority, explained that
deference under [Chevron] does not necessarily require an agency's
exercise of express notice-and-comment rulemaking power. But there is
25. See, e.g., Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1991).
26. See, e.g., EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship
Under
the
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
27. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.
28. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Policy Guidance on Executive
Order 13145: To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic
Information (2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-genetic.html#l.
29. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, A Technical Assistance
Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(1992).
30. See, e.g., EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 2:
Threshold Issues,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); Compliance

Manual,
Section
902
Definition
of
the
Term
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).

Disability,

31. See, e.g., Rebecca Harmer White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment
DiscriminationPolicy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation,

1995 Utah L. Rev. 51, 102-07 (discussing the role that "format" plays and should play in the
binding (or nonbinding) nature of EEOC interpretation).
32. 535 U.S. 106 (2002).
33. Id. at 113-14.
34. Id. at 113 & n.2.
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no need to resolve any question of deference here. We find the EEOC
rule not only a reasonable one, but the position we would adopt even if
there were no formal rule and we were interpreting the statute from
scratch. Because we so clearly agree with the EEOC, there is no occasion
35
to defer and no point in asking what kind of deference, or how much.
The Court also avoided the deference question in a recent case involving
the EEOC's regulations under the ADEA. In General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc. v. Cline, the Court considered whether the statute permits suits
by individuals over forty (and thus within the law's protected class) when
they involve claims that older workers are treated better than younger
workers. 36 The EEOC's regulations provided that these reverse age
discrimination claims were permissible under the Act. 37 In rejecting the
on
regulations, the Court declared that "today, we neither defer nor settle
38
any degree of deference because the Commission is clearly wrong."
In decisions under the ADA, the Court has repeatedly declined to resolve
whether it will defer to what might be the EEOC's most important
regulatory pronouncement-the definition of disability under the Act. The
ADA's structure complicates the question of the proper degree of deference
for these regulations. The ADA's definition of disability is contained in a
section that precedes any of the Act's substantive Titles. 39 For each of the
Titles, Congress authorized different agencies to promulgate regulations
implementing the law, but no one agency is specifically and unambiguously
tasked with interpreting the section of the statute containing the disability
definition. 40 However, some of the most central provisions of Title I, which
prohibits discrimination in employment, include definitions that themselves
require definition of the term "disability. ' 4 1 Indeed, the precise meaning of
"disability" is integral to application of the Act's employment provisions
since only an individual with a disability, as defined by the ADA, can claim
protection under the statute. 4 2 Given the centrality of this term to the Act's
employment provisions, it seems entirely reasonable that Congress intended
the agency charged with implementing these provisions-the EEOC-to

35. Id. at 114 (citations omitted). Concurring in the judgment, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor challenged the majority's refusal to address the deference question and noted that
the reasoning the Court used suggested that it was applying Chevron deference. See id. at
121-23.

36. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
37. Id. at 585.

38. Id. at 600; see also id. at 603-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000). In addition to its employment-related provisions
(contained in Title I), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") addresses disability
discrimination in public services, public accommodations and transportation (Titles 11 and
III).
40. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999).
41. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) ("Qualified Individual with a Disability"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(9) ("Reasonable Accommodation").
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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flesh out the meaning of "disability. '43 An extraordinary number of ADA
cases turn on this threshold definitional question, and the EEOC has issued
regulations interpreting and offering detail as to the statutory definition. 44
These regulations have been central to several of the Court's recent ADA
opinions, but in each opinion the Court has "assume[d], without deciding,
that such regulations are valid" and declared that it had "no occasion to
decide what level of deference, if any, they are due. ''45
The Court has similarly declined to settle on any firm standard of
deference in considering the interpretive guidelines the EEOC promulgated
in connection with its ADA regulations. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, for
example, the Court concluded that in determining whether an individual is
disabled, a court must consider the individual in his mitigated state (e.g.,
with eyeglasses, rather than without). 46 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court rejected interpretive guidelines issued by both the EEOC and the
Department of Justice. Without addressing the proper level of deference for
the interpretive guidance, the Court summarily concluded that the
guidelines were so plainly wrong that they would not be accorded deference
47
under any standard.
While the Court has often avoided specifying how much deference
EEOC interpretations should receive, in other cases the Court has applied
43. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 514-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
did give the EEOC authority to issue regulations defining disability under the statute because
of its repeated use of the word disability incorporated into other definitions that clearly are
within the scope of the EEOC's authority to promulgate regulations); White, supra note 4, at
580-81.
44. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-(j) (2004); see also White, supra note 4, at 550 (noting
that, in issuing its regulations, interpretive guidance, and technical assistance manual under
Title I, the agency focused a significant part of its attention on the definition of disability).
45. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563 n.10 (1999); see also Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002) (noting that the persuasive
authority of the EEOC regulations was unclear because they interpreted a portion of the
ADA over which no agency had interpretive authority, but concluding that because the
regulations were reasonable, the Court need not reach any decision about the level of
deference they were due); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 ("Because both parties accept these
regulations as valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to decide this case, we
have no occasion to consider what deference they are due, if any."); cf Olmstead v. L.C. ex
rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 582-83 (1999). In Olmstead, the Court stated that
[b]ecause the Department [of Justice] is the agency directed by Congress to issue
[ADA] Title II regulations, its views warrant respect. This Court need not inquire
whether the degree of deference described in [Chevron] is in order; the wellreasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.
ld.; see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) ("Every agency to consider the
issue under the Rehabilitation Act found statutory coverage for persons with asymptomatic
HIV. Responsibility for administering the Rehabilitation Act was not delegated to a single
agency, but we need not pause to inquire whether this causes us to withhold deference to
agency interpretations under [Chevron].").
46. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. The interpretive guidelines, like the regulations, were
subject to notice and comment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20).
47. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 ("Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of these
interpretive guidelines, we have no need in this case to decide what deference is due.").
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either Chevron or Skidmore to the agency's regulations and other
interpretive statements. Despite the fact that Title VII, the ADA, and the
ADEA all explicitly grant some rulemaking authority to the EEOC, the
Court has applied Chevron deference in only two antidiscrimination cases,
4 8 In only one of the
one under the ADA and one under the ADEA.
two did
49
agency.
the
to
defer
to
the Court choose
Most cases considering EEOC interpretations have applied the Skidmore
standard, and the agency's views have, perhaps not surprisingly, often fared
poorly in these cases. More interesting, perhaps, is what these cases
suggest about the Skidmore standard-that its open-ended and malleable list
of persuasive factors lends itself to a transparently results-oriented
evaluation. In two Title VII cases, the Court devoted considerable
discussion to the administrative deference question. In each, the Court
applied Skidmore and rejected the EEOC's interpretation of the law. Each
case garnered a strong dissenting opinion that also applied the same
Skidmore deference standard but reached a contrary conclusion as to the
persuasiveness of the agency's views.
The Court first applied the Skidmore standard to an EEOC interpretive
guideline in its 1976 decision in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert.50 In that
case, plaintiffs challenged an employer-run disability plan that excluded
coverage for pregnancy and childbirth-related work loss. 5 1 Plaintiffs
claimed that this exclusion, given the otherwise expansive nature of the
policy, violated Title VII's prohibition on discrimination because of sex.
They relied in part on an EEOC interpretive guideline concluding that Title
VII's sex discrimination ban required employers to provide coverage for
pregnancy-related work loss to the same extent that they covered other

48. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); Pub. Employee Ret.
Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); cf Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S.
81, 86-87 (2002) (applying Chevron to the Secretary of Labor's regulations under the Family
Medical Leave Act and invalidating the regulations).
49. See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84 (applying Chevron and deferring to the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA's "direct threat" provision); Betts, 492 U.S. at 170 (applying
Chevron and declining deference to the agency's interpretation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's ("ADEA's") "subterfuge" provision). In a third case, the Court, although
never mentioning Chevron, appeared to apply that standard and to defer to the EEOC's
procedural regulation. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 114-15
(1988) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has
primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical or any other
standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need only be
reasonable to be entitled to deference.").
50. 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976). Interestingly, before 1976 the Court made little
mention of the weight that it should accord the agency's determinations, but each time the
issue was raised, the Court observed that "[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by
the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-34 (1971); see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 94 (1973). As I discuss in Part II, the new reluctance to defer to the EEOC
corresponded with a generally greater skepticism about claims of discrimination.
51. Gilbert,429 U.S. at 129.
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temporary disabilities. 52 The Court rejected that guideline and held that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII. Applying Skidmore, the Court concluded that the
agency's 1972 interpretation lacked the "power to persuade" because it
contradicted the position taken in a 1966 opinion letter penned by the
EEOC General Counsel. 53 Justice William Brennan's dissenting opinion
argued forcefully that "this is a paradigm example of the type of complex
economic and social inquiry that Congress wisely left to resolution by the
EEOC pursuant to its Title VII mandate." 54 Justice Brennan then argued
that the majority opinion mischaracterized the history of the EEOC's
position on pregnancy discrimination. In fact, the 1972 guideline was the
agency's "first formalized, systemic statement on 'employment policies
relating to pregnancy and childbirth."'' 55 While the earlier opinion letter
had declined to impose liability on employers, this opinion was not a
statement of affirmative policy. choice by the agency, but instead reflected
"an unwillingness to impose additional, potentially premature costs" on
employers during a period of deliberation about the appropriate
interpretation. 56 When the history of the contested regulation is viewed this
way, the EEOC's position is not problematically inconsistent as the
majority found, but instead "represents a particularly conscientious and
reasonable product of EEOC deliberations" of the sort entitled to
57
deference.
The Court applied the Skidmore standard in EEOC v. ArabianAmerican
Oil Co. (Aramco) 58 and again rejected an EEOC policy statement, this one
applying Title VII to U.S. citizens employed overseas. 59 The deference
question in this case was complicated somewhat by the presumption against
extraterritorial application of laws, which requires Congress to express
clearly its intention to apply the law outside the United States. 60 The EEOC
had reached its interpretation of Title VII in reliance on the statute's
extremely broad jurisdictional language, which extended coverage to any
employer affecting commerce "between a State and any place outside
thereof. '6 1 The Commission saw further evidence of congressional intent
in the "alien exemption" provision, which denied the Act's coverage "with
respect to the employment of aliens outside any State. '62 Because the Act
excluded only aliens, the EEOC concluded, it could reasonably be
52. Id. at 140.

53. Id. at 142-43.
54. Id. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 157.

56. Id.
57. Id. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent that did not focus on administrative
deference, but in which he approvingly describes Justice Brennan's opinion as "persuasively
expos[ing]" "the questions of motive, administrative expertise and policy." Id. at 162.
58. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
59. Id. at 256-58.
60. Id. at 248.
61. Id. at 249-50.
62. Id. at 253.

2006]

SKEPTICISMAND EXPERTISE

1947

interpreted to apply to United States citizens employed outside any State. 63
The Court rejected the EEOC's interpretation of these provisions of the
statute. The majority's rationale was based in substantial part on the notion
that these statutory provisions were too ambiguous to satisfy what it
described as the "clear statement" rule for extraterritorial application of the
law. The Court also dismissed the agency's interpretation by characterizing
the EEOC's position on the extraterritorial application of Title VII as
inconsistent over time and thus suspect under Skidmore's standards. To
support its view, the Court noted that, although the agency had maintained
that the statute applied to citizens employed overseas in a variety of
contexts between 1975 and 1989, 64 a 1971 EEOC regulation discussed the
statute's application to "both citizens and noncitizens, domiciled or residing
in the United States." 65 The Court read this earlier regulation as
inconsistent with the EEOC's later position, and thus, while the Court
"[did] not wholly discount the weight to be given to the 1988 guideline," it
concluded that the agency's interpretation was ultimately unpersuasive,
66
particularly in light of the presumption against extraterritorial application.
The dissent (in which Justice Stevens joined) challenged the majority's
aggressive application of the presumption against extraterritorial application
of laws as well as its characterization of the history of the EEOC's position
on the application of Title VII outside of the United States. As to the first
issue, the dissent argued that the majority had overstated the strength of the
presumption to create a novel "clear statement" rule. 6 7 By creating this new
requirement, the majority weighted the scales against deference to the
EEOC. As to the majority's rejection of the EEOC's interpretation as
inconsistent with the agency's later views, the dissent observed that the
challenged EEOC regulation was not inconsistent at all. The agency's
statement that Title VII applied to "both citizens and noncitizens, domiciled
or residing in the United States" was made "to underscore that neither the
citizenship nor the residency status of an individual" affects the
applicability of Title VII's ban on national origin discrimination. 6 8 The
statement had absolutely nothing to do with whether Title VII applied
extraterritorially or only within the United States and thus revealed no
inconsistency in the EEOC's position on extraterritoriality. Applying
Skidmore, the dissent concluded that the EEOC's position deserved greater
69
respect.

63. Id.
64. The EEOC had articulated this view about Title VII's extraterritorial application in a
1975 letter from the agency's general counsel, testimony given in 1983 by the Chairman of
the EEOC, a 1985 decision by the Commission, and a 1989 Policy Statement. Id.at 256-57.
65. Id. at 257.
66. Id. at 258.
67. Id. at 261-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 277.
69. Id. at 275-78.
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Only twice has the Supreme Court applied Skidmore to EEOC statements
70
and agreed with the EEOC's interpretation of an antidiscrimination law.
Notably, Justice Stevens authored the one majority opinion in which the
Court seemed truly to accord some considered respect to the agency's view,
in Clackamas GastroenterologyAssociates v. Wells. In Clackamas, the
Court reaffirmed that an EEOC Compliance Manual is not entitled to strong
deference "even though it may constitute a 'body of experience and
informed judgment' to which we may resort for guidance." 7 1 However,
applying Skidmore, Justice Stevens's opinion found that the agency's view
was persuasive, spent considerable time describing that view, and
ultimately deferred to that view as a persuasive one, evaluating the 72
district
court's findings "under the EEOC's standard that we endorse today."
Taken together these opinions suggest that the standard of deference may
be less important than the way it is applied. 73 The contrast between Justice
Stevens's approach and that taken by Justice Antonin Scalia in these cases
is instructive. Justice Stevens has made it abundantly clear that he endorses
a framework for administrative deference in which Chevron deference is
applied only to a limited range of agency action and the Skidmore standard
is applied to the majority of administrative interpretations. 74 But this
theoretical model says little about the respect he accords the EEOC in
practice. In two recent opinions authored by the Justice, the Court agreed
with the EEOC's interpretation. 75 And in a number of cases, Justice
Stevens dissented when the Court rejected the EEOC's views and criticized
the Court's decision to chart its own policy course in the face of a
persuasive administrative interpretation of the law. 76 By contrast, Justice
Scalia has long taken the position that the Skidmore standard is an
"anachronism" that was replaced by Chevron, and that all agency action
70. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003); Meritor
Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). In another recent case, the Court agreed
with the EEOC's position without mentioning any particular deference standard. See Smith
v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005). In Smith, the Court concluded that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA. Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court
included a detailed analysis of the statutory text and purpose and then very briefly "note[d]
that.., the EEOC, which is the agency charged by Congress with responsibility for
implementing the statute, [has] consistently interpreted the ADEA to authorize relief on a
disparate-impact theory." Id. at 1544; see also id. at 1546 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that the majority opinion reflects "independent
determination of the disparate-impact question" rather than deference to the EEOC).
71. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.9 (2003)
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
72. Id. at 448-51.
73. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the
Courts, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 40 (1990); Rossi, supra note 15, at 1125-29 (discussing the
Court's three different ways of applying Skidmore in the Christensen decision).
74. See, e.g., Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
582 n.2, 594-95 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544; Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448-51.
76. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 513 (1999); EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 224, 277 (1991); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 162 (1976); cf Christensen, 529 U.S. at 594-95.
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should receive the same deference. 77 And yet, even applying Chevron, he
'78
quite regularly finds the EEOC's interpretations "unreasonable.
The disparate approaches taken by members of the Court to deference to
the EEOC, even when they purport to apply the same level of deference,
confirms that the formal framework for administrative deference leaves
considerable discretion to practical application. The Skidmore standardwhich is most often applicable to EEOC statements about
antidiscrimination law-is particularly open-ended. Moreover, the Court
retains for itself the broadest possible discretion by simply declining to
settle on any standard of deference in a significant number of cases
reviewing EEOC regulations and other interpretive statements.
In
exercising this discretion, the Court has revealed a lack of respect for the
EEOC that calls for an explanation.
II. SKEPTICISM AND EXPERTISE: POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
SUPREME COURT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE

EEOC

The Supreme Court is making a mistake by so often rejecting the
EEOC's regulations and other statements interpreting and implementing
federal antidiscrimination law. The Court's attitude towards the EEOC
seems inconsistent with its articulated standards for administrative
deference. Even under Skidmore, administrative interpretations should
receive great respect if they are enacted with procedural care and reflect the
application of expertise to a question on which there is statutory
ambiguity. 79 While a detailed analysis of the EEOC's process for issuing
regulations, interpretive guidelines, and other analyses of antidiscrimination
requirements is far beyond the scope of this Essay, it is notable that the
EEOC's interpretive statements have generally been promulgated after a
relatively careful and public process. Indeed, "[s]ince the mid-1970s, the
agency has issued its interpretive guidelines only after extensive study,
notice and comment, and sometimes public hearings." 80 The agency's
77. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
78. See, e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); cf Christensen, 529
U.S. at 589-91 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But see Smith,
125 S. Ct. at 1546-49 (Scalia, J., concurring) (applying Chevron and deferring); Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 601 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same);
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 440 (joining the majority without comment, although the opinion
applied the Skidmore standard to review an EEOC interpretation).
79. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 228; Krotoszynski, supra note 15, at 753-54;
Wildermuth, supra note 5, at 1909-12. It is entirely possible that no agency receives
significant deference in application of Skidmore, and that the EEOC is less a special case
than simply one among many. That question is beyond the scope of this Essay. To the
extent that it is the case, I imagine that the Court's reasons for lack of deference will differ in
each particular context. The question remains, then, what explains the lack of deference to
this specific agency.
80. White, supra note 31, at 98.
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regulations and Interpretive Guidance under the ADA, for example, were
81
both the end result of an extended period of public comment and analysis.
Moreover, these and other EEOC statements do reflect considered
judgment, informed by expert analysis and research, about application of
open-ended or unclear statutory commands. They are precisely the type of
careful, research-driven interpretation that warrants great respect from the
courts.
Congress has provided some evidence that the Court's lack of respect for
the EEOC's interpretations of these statutes is in error. On at least three
occasions, the Supreme Court's decision to disregard EEOC interpretation
of federal antidiscrimination laws has led Congress to reverse the Court's
decisions and essentially to enact the EEOC's interpretation directly into
law. 82 The legislative overruling of Supreme Court decisions is subject to a
81. The Commission began with an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and it
"actively solicited and considered public comment." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726-01 (July 26, 1991).
In response, the agency received 138 comments from different organizations and individuals.
The Commission also held sixty-two input meetings in field offices, which were attended by
over 2400 representatives from employer groups and disability rights advocates. When the
ADA regulations were set forth for public comment, the Commission received almost 700
comments from interested individuals and organizations. The EEOC took these comments
into account not only in issuing the final regulations, but also in promulgating its interpretive
guidance, contained in the appendix to the regulations, and in the Compliance Manual
sections that it issued to provide more detail about particular topics. Id.; see also White,
supra note 4, at 583-84.
82. The first such instance was the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA") in 1978, which was a direct response to the Court's decision in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert, the Court held that a disability plan that
covered employees for a host of conditions, but excluded pregnancy, did not violate Title VII
because the statutorily prohibited sex discrimination did not include pregnancy
discrimination. In so doing, the Court rejected the EEOC's contrary view. Congress
responded quickly, adding language to the statute that conformed the law to the EEOC
interpretation rejected by the Court. In passing the PDA, its sponsors were emphatic that the
Gilbert dissenters had gotten it right. Proponents of the bill emphasized that "the bill is
merely reestablishing the law as it was understood prior to Gilbert by the EEOC .. "
S. Rep. No. 95-331, at 7-8 (1977), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4756. Congress
has twice amended the ADEA to accord with an EEOC interpretation rejected by the Court.
See Age Discrimination Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2, 92 Stat. 189
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (overriding United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623) (overriding Pub.
Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)). In both instances, "the
conferees specifically disagree[d] with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning." H.R.
Rep. No. 950, at 8 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 528, 529. The
second time, the bills introduced in both the House and the Senate included specific statutory
findings that "as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in Betts, legislative action is
necessary to restore the original congressional intent in passing and amending the ADEA."
S. 1511, 101st Cong. (1990); H.R. 3200, 101st Cong. (1989). And, finally, in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Congress legislatively overruled the Supreme Court's decision in
Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, in which the Court had rejected an EEOC guideline that provided for
Title VII coverage to U.S. citizens employed overseas. Within months of that decision,
Congress added a provision to the 1991 amendments so that the agency's position on
extraterritorial application of the law was explicitly included in the statute's text. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1077 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981).

2006]

SKEPTICISM AND EXPERTISE

1951

variety of interpretations and should not be read to mean too much. 83
Nevertheless, these three instances in which Congress has expressed its
strong and specific disagreement with the Court's rejection of EEOC
interpretations of antidiscrimination laws should at least give the Court
pause as to the ease with which it disregards the Commission's positions.
So why does the Court remain so resistant to accepting this agency's views
about the statutes it has been charged with implementing and enforcing?
The key to the Court's reluctance may rest in the subject matter that is
the domain of this particular administrative body and in particular in
skepticism about the scope of the problem of discrimination and uncertainty
about the nature and locus of expertise in defining the problem. I suggest
that two different ideas about expertise cloud the Court's approach to
EEOC interpretation. First, the Court may believe that the problem of
discrimination is less susceptible to expert evaluation and understanding
than the complex scientific or economic subjects that occupy other federal
agencies, and thus that the reasons for administrative deference are
weakened in this area. Second, discrimination is an area in which the
Supreme Court may perceive itself as having a particular expertise in light
of its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. A further possible explanation
for the Court's attitude towards the EEOC may simply be the skepticism of
members of the Court about the continuing problem of discrimination and
the appropriate scope of legal responses to it.
A. DiscriminationandEEOC Expertise
The Court's reluctance to defer to the EEOC may stem from a view that
discrimination is a subject of common knowledge, not susceptible to expert
analysis.
The rationale behind judicial deference to administrative
interpretation is, at least to some extent, that the agency offers an expert's
opinion on the topic. Skidmore deference in particular rests on this notion
of expertise. If there is no such thing as expertise in identifying or
addressing discrimination, then there is little reason for courts to defer to
the EEOC's interpretations. To the extent that this view drives the Court's
lack of respect for the EEOC, it ignores the legislative desire for an agency
with expertise in this field. It also avoids the realities of discrimination as a
complex social and economic problem whose causes and solutions in fact
do require expert understanding.
The EEOC came into being with the enactment of Title VII in 1964. The
agency created in that initial statute was relatively weak. Congress debated
whether to give the new administrative body cease-and-desist powers but
ultimately concluded that resolution of disputes under the new law should
go through the courts. 84 In its initial form, the agency was not even
responsible for bringing claims of discrimination under the law; that
83. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 n.7 (1991) (arguing
that congressional override does not demonstrate that the Court's decision was wrong).
84. See White, supra note 31, at 59.

1952

FORDHAMLA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 74

responsibility rested with the Attorney General's office. 85 In 1972,
however, Congress amended Title VII and significantly expanded the
powers of the EEOC. 8 6 This expanded authority indicates that Congress
recognized a need for an administrative agency with acknowledged
expertise in the area of discrimination. As was explained in both the House
and Senate Committee Reports to the 1972 amendments,
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and
pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally
describe the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than
simply intentional wrongs, and the literature on the subject is replete with
discussions of, for example, the mechanics of seniority and lines of
progression, (and) perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act
discriminatory practices through various institutional devices .... In
short, the problem is one whose resolution in many instances requires not
only expert assistance, but also the technical perception that the problem
exists in 87the first instance, and that the system complained of is
unlawful.
Moreover, the legislative history of these amendments suggests not only
that Congress viewed discrimination as a subject of possible expertise, but
that the legislature expected the EEOC to provide that expertise. The
Senate Report explained that "[i]t is expected that through the
administrative process, the Commission will continue to define and develop
the approaches to handling serious problems of discrimination that are
'8 8
involved in the area of employment.
In the ensuing decades, it has become increasingly clear that the
legislature amending Title VII in 1972 correctly identified employment
discrimination as a complex phenomenon whose identification and
resolution requires expertise. Indeed, the causes and effects of, as well as
solutions for, discrimination are being studied by scholars and researchers
in a number of different disciplines. Social psychologists studying the
phenomenon of discrimination have written extensively about the dynamics
underlying bias, which are now recognized as significantly more
89
complicated than was understood when Title VII was first enacted.
85. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 261-62 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d).
86. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
87. S.Rep. No. 92-415, at 5 (1971); see also H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, at 8 (1972).
88. S.Rep. No. 92-415, at 19; see also H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, at 10 (1972), as reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2146 ("Administrative tribunals are better equipped to handle the
complicated issues involved in employment discrimination cases."); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74-75 n.9 (1977) (noting that Congress, in the 1972
amendments to Title VII, did not specify what kind of "reasonable accommodation"
employers would be required to make to employees' religious needs, "preferring to leave
that question open for future resolution by the EEOC").
89. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third
Wave, 57 J. Soc. Issues 829, 830 (2001). See generally Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 741, 745-49 (2005)
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Organizational psychologists study the dynamics of particular work
environments to assess how different structural and cultural norms
influence workplace conduct, including the extent and nature of
Human resources specialists consult with employers
discrimination.9"
seeking to minimize discriminatory misconduct in their workplaces. 9 1 And
in both academic and popular writings over the years, economists,
sociologists, anthropologists, and historians have further contributed to an
appreciation of the complex nature of both the sources and the effects of
discrimination.
The need for expertise in applying federal law to the problem of
workplace discrimination is heightened by the fact that the nature of
discrimination in employment is constantly evolving. In the early years of
federal prohibitions against discrimination, most of the claims filed with the
EEOC were relatively straightforward failure to hire claims, in which the
complainant alleged race or sex discrimination. 92 During the 1980s and
1990s, so-called "glass ceiling" claims were particularly prevalent.9 3 These
claims, which often challenge structural biases and multiple decision points,
added a layer of complexity absent from the earlier claims. And new trends
are emerging today: more sexual harassment against teenagers working in
establishments with high turnover, minimal training, and young managers;
an increasing number of claims alleging "accent discrimination"; a growing
problem with pregnancy discrimination; and a jump in the number of claims
of retaliation. 94 Added to this panoply of issues under Title VII are the
extremely complicated questions that can arise in implementing the
requirements of the ADA, which require recourse to experts in medicine,
95
human resources, and even architecture.
(discussing the current social science research on stereotyping and bias); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1186-1211 (1995) (same).

90. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 Yale L.J. 2061, 2138 (2003)
(discussing studies of sexual dynamics in the workplace).
91. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
StructuralApproach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 463 n.12, 464 n.13 (2001) (describing how
organizational and human resource specialists have helped employers study and attempt to
alter workplace dynamics).
92. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Performance & Accountability
Report (2004), availableat http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/par/2004/.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. As just one example, in its administration of the ADA, the EEOC provides guidance
on the kinds of complicated details that the statute could not possibly speak to, and that
courts are ill-equipped to assess. For example, the agency has published question and
answer documents that provide guidance on epilepsy, diabetes, vision problems, intellectual
disabilities, and cancer in the workplace. See e.g., EEOC Questions & Answers About
Blindness in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (2005),
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/blindness.html; EEOC Questions & Answers About Cancer in the
Workplace

and

the

Americans

with

Disabilities

Act

(ADA)

(2005),

http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/cancer.html; EEOC Questions & Answers About Diabetes in the
Workplace and the ADA (2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/diabetes.html; EEOC Questions

& Answers About Epilepsy in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act
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The EEOC is responsible for tracking these trends and issues and
understanding how federal law should respond. In order to meet this
obligation, the agency conducts research studies, collaborates "with a broad
range of stakeholder groups," issues policy guidance designed to facilitate
compliance and protect the rights of workers under the law, and
promulgates rules and regulations designed to clarify the law and to ensure
compliance. 96 The Commission is the exclusive federal agency responsible
for the implementation of federal laws prohibiting workplace
discrimination, and in that capacity it serves as a repository for a wealth of
information about the discrimination-related trends and concerns in
workplaces around the country. In its efforts to bring this collected
knowledge to bear on the best interpretation of the gaps and ambiguities in
antidiscrimination statutes, the EEOC acts as precisely the kind of expert
that Skidmore deference in particular seems to anticipate. Thus, to the
extent that the Court's relative indifference to the EEOC's interpretation of
antidiscrimination law is a product of the belief that an administrative
agency cannot develop expertise in this field, the Court should rethink that
underlying assumption.
B. Discriminationand the Supreme Court's Expertise
Another possible explanation for the Court's reluctance to defer to the
EEOC's interpretations of federal laws prohibiting discrimination is that the
Court simply does not want to relinquish its own perceived authority and
expertise in this context. 97 A number of explanations might be offered for a
sense among members of the Court that they have a special expertise in
defining discrimination.
Throughout the history of federal
antidiscrimination laws, and particularly in the early years after the
enactment of Title VII, the federal courts have played a unique role in
filling statutory gaps in this area. 98 Moreover, individual Justices have, in

(ADA) (2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/epilepsy.html; EEOC Questions & Answers
About Intellectual Disabilities in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) (2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/intellectual-disabilities.html.
Each of these
question and answer documents covers topics ranging from medical details about the
particular condition, to establishing processes to maintain the confidentiality of an
employee's medical records to providing workplace accommodations, to recognizing when
the particular condition meets the ADA definition of disability. The publications thus blend
legal analysis with information gleaned from a host of experts whose collective knowledge is
essential to responding appropriately to the legal mandates.
96. EEOC, Performance and Accountability Report FY 2004, Management's Discussion
and
Analysis
(2004),
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/par/2004/management-discussion.html#introduction.
97. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99, 139-40 (1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/PresidentCivil Rights Game, 79 Cal. L.
Rev. 613, 664 (1991) ("The Court imposes its own preferences onto civil rights statutes.");
White, supra note 4, at 570-74.
98. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of
PrivateEnforcement andJudicialDevelopments, 20 St. Louis U. L.J. 225 (1976).
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different ways, played active roles in shaping antidiscrimination law. 99 A
third source of perceived expertise in this area might flow from the Court's
work interpreting the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent
that this third possibility is in play, it suggests an inappropriate intrusion of
certain constitutional constraints into the interpretation of federal law.
In fact, there is some evidence in the Court's opinions interpreting Title
VII, the ADA, and the ADEA that the Court relies on the policy judgments
that inform its equal protection jurisprudence when interpreting the
substantive provisions of federal antidiscrimination laws. Of course, there
is some relationship between the Constitution and federal antidiscrimination

law.

Congress can legislate only pursuant to a specific grant of

constitutional authority, and the Constitution thus necessarily poses a limit
on what any federal legislation can do. 100 However, when the Court is
merely analyzing statutory language and need not confront questions of
congressional authority to enact a particular law, there is no reason for
01
constitutional analysis to intrude into the decision. 1
The Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert provides the
clearest example of the Court's tendency to impose constitutional analysis
upon this area of statutory interpretation. 0 2 Two years before deciding that
case, the Supreme Court had concluded in Geduldig v. Aiello that
discrimination against pregnant women did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's
Equal
Protection
Clause
as
impermissible
sex
discrimination. 10 3 In Gilbert, the Court considered whether an employer
99. From 1982 to 1990, Justice Clarence Thomas was the Chairman of the EEOC. See
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/bios/clarencethomas.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2006). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also litigated a number of important sex discrimination
cases and served as the Director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's Rights
Project before becoming a judge. See The Supreme Court Historical Society,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/myweb/justice/ginsburg.htm
(last visited Jan. 22,
2006).
100. Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA were all passed pursuant to Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause and under the Fourteenth Amendment. For each of those Acts,
the Court has considered whether it was an appropriate exercise of either source of
legislative authority. Fairly early on, the Court concluded that Title VII was validly enacted
under both provisions. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976). For both the
ADA and the ADEA, the Court concluded that Congress could not have been acting
pursuant to its authority to enforce the substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (ADA); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (ADEA). This line of cases, however, says nothing
about the content of the statutes' substantive prohibitions. Because Congress also relied on
its Commerce Clause powers to pass these laws, the limitation on Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority affects only the applicability of the statutes to government employers.
101. The Court has quite explicitly recognized the opposite point-that Title VII analysis
should not intrude into the realm of equal protection. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976) (stating "[w]e have never held that the constitutional standard for
adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable
under Title VII, and we decline to do so today").
102. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
103. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court explained that
[w]hile it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
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violated Title VII by offering employees health benefits that excluded
pregnancy-related costs. The majority concluded that a violation of Title
VII's prohibition on intentional sex discrimination could not be proved
"[a]bsent a showing of gender-based discrimination, as that term is defined
in Geduldig."'10 4 In incorporating its constitutional definition of sex
discrimination into Title VII, the Court offered no analytical justification
and very little explanation for its decision, saying only,
While there is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this
language, intended to incorporate into Title VII the concepts of
discrimination which have evolved from court decisions construing the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the similarities
between the congressional language and some of those decisions surely
indicate10 that
the latter are a useful starting point in interpreting the
5
former.
Justice Stevens dissented in Gilbert, starting his opinion with the
observation that "[t]he word 'discriminate' does not appear in the Equal
Protection Clause." 10 6 Moreover, as Stevens noted, a plaintiff seeking to
prove a constitutional violation bears a heavier burden than a plaintiff
claiming a Title VII violation. Thus, "the constitutional holding in
[Geduldig] does not control the question of statutory interpretation
10 7
presented by this case."
The Court has never since Gilbert been so explicit in its incorporation of
constitutional concepts into statutory interpretation. However, there is
reason to wonder what role equal protection jurisprudence continues to play
in the Court's interpretation of antidiscrimination statutes. In particular, the
Court's hostility to disability and age discrimination claims under the ADA
and the ADEA raises the question whether the policy judgments reflected in
equal protection jurisprudence are influencing the Court's statutory
decisions.

classification ....The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender
as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory
analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes.
Id.at 496 n.20.
104. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137 n.15.
105. Id.at 133. In Gilbert,the Court asserts that
The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known at the time of the
enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth Amendment
for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial construction.
When Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate... because
of... sex," without further explanation of its meaning, we should not readily infer
that it meant something different from what the concept of discrimination has
traditionally meant.
Id.at 145.
106. Id.at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id.at 160-61 (citations omitted).
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Equal protection analysis offers different levels of constitutional
protection for different kinds of discrimination. If a classification interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or disadvantages a suspect class,
that classification is reviewed with the highest level, "strict scrutiny."' 108
This level of examination has been described as "strict in theory, fatal in
fact,"1 0 9 and classifications based on, for example, race, are extremely
unlikely to be upheld as constitutional.
Classifications that create
disadvantages based on gender or immigration status are accorded a middlelevel "intermediate scrutiny." 110 All other classifications-such as those
based on age or disability-are subject to "rational basis review." 1 1 When
a classification is reviewed under this rational basis standard, it will most
likely survive constitutional scrutiny. 112 The Equal Protection Clause is
thus interpreted and applied with the judgment that some kinds of
discrimination are worse than others.
The federal antidiscrimination statutes do not contain these same policy
judgments.1 13 Certainly the statutes are not identical, but there is nothing in
the ADEA or ADA to suggest that Congress believed these forms of
discrimination-age and disability-are less significant than the
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Indeed, some have observed that the
ADA offers arguably greater protection than Title VII. 114
The Court's decisions under the ADA and the ADEA often seem,
however, to reflect the basic policy judgment that age and disability
discrimination are not as unacceptable as discrimination on the basis of sex
or race. Sometimes this judgment is quite explicit. For example, a number
of cases interpreting the ADEA are cast in terms that parrot the language
used in equal protection age discrimination cases. In explaining why agebased classifications are subject only to rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court has asserted more than once that
[w]hile the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free
of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been
108. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
109. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978).
110. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
440.
111. City of Cleburne,473 U.S. at 441-43.
112. Id. at 440; Schweikerv. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
113. Title VII does draw some specific distinctions between race and other forms of
discrimination. For example, while an employer can defend against a charge of sex
discrimination by arguing that sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification," there is no
such defense available to a charge of race discrimination. The statute thus reflects
congressional judgment that race discrimination and gender discrimination are different and
should be treated differently.
114. See R. Bales, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Conflicts Between
Reasonable Accommodation and Collective Bargaining, 2 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 161,

166-67 (1992) (describing why Title VII provides insufficient protection for the disabled); S.
Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue:

Why Disability Law

Claims Are Different, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 603, 618-26 (2001) (describing the difference
between Title I of the ADA and Title VII protections).
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discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not
experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected
to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities. 115
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor used remarkably similar language last Term,
arguing against an interpretation of the ADEA that would permit disparate
impact claims. "No one," she asserted, "would argue that older workers
have suffered disadvantages as a result of entrenched historical patterns of
discrimination, like racial minorities have."' 16 Justice Stevens's majority
opinion in the same case (finding that the statute did permit disparate
impact claims) also observed that
age, unlike race or other classifications protected by Title VII, not
uncommonly has relevance to an individual's capacity to engage in
certain types of employment.... Moreover, intentional discrimination
on the basis of age has not occurred at the same levels as discrimination
against those protected by Title V1.17
Without disputing the truth of these assertions, it is simply worth noting that
they demonstrate explicitly the assumptions with which the Justices
approach claims of age discrimination.
While the same explicitly parallel language has not been used in
disability cases, the Court's ADA decisions reflect a constant effort to cabin
a remarkably expansive remedial statute. 118 It seems entirely plausible that
the Court's discomfort with the ADA's broad potential reach stems in some
part from its sense of disability's place in the hierarchy of invidious
discrimination. When the EEOC's interpretation would give full breadth to
the ADA's remedial reach, the Court's discomfort with the statute's reach
may underlie its rejection of the agency's views.
It is, of course, impossible to know how much the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence intrudes into its evaluation of the substance of
antidiscrimination statutes. I suspect that there is some intrusion, and that,
together with other justifications for judicial expertise in the area, the
Fourteenth Amendment affects the Court's willingness to give the EEOC
any considerable respect.

115. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
116. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1555 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (stating "age
discrimination rarely was based on the sort of animus motivating some other forms of
discrimination"); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983).
117. Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1545.
118. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare
Reform, 44 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 921, 931-36 (2003); Ruby Afram, Note, New Diagnoses
and the ADA: A Case Study of Fibromyalgia and Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, 4 Yale J.
Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 85, 87 (2004).
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C. Discriminationand Skepticism
The Court's approach in these cases may be not only a product of the
institutional concerns of deference and expertise but also a consequence of
substantive judgments about discrimination. At base, the reluctance to
defer reflects a more general skepticism about the problem of
discrimination and legal efforts to redress it. When the EEOC interprets
federal antidiscrimination laws in ways that appear to favor plaintiffemployees over defendant-employers, a majority of the Court may decline
deference to the agency because the Justices are troubled by the agency's
expansive approach to these statutes. This skepticism is reflected in the
historical evolution of the Court's treatment of EEOC interpretations.
Moreover, the Court's often-divided opinions in this area parallel the
divisions within the legislature that first created the EEOC-suggesting that
these debates may have less to do with the relative expertise of different
governmental bodies and more to do with core political values.
Cases in which the Court has declined deference to the EEOC's position
have frequently involved the Court's rejection of a more expansive,
employee-friendly reading of the particular statute in favor of a more
restrictive reading. In Gilbert, the Court limited the reach of Title VII in
rejecting the EEOC's view that pregnancy discrimination was sex
discrimination. 119 In Aramco, the Court rejected the EEOC's opinion that
Title VII applied to U.S. citizens employed overseas, thus restricting the
number of employees protected by the law. 120 In Sutton, the Court rejected
the EEOC's regulation requiring that disability be evaluated without regard
to mitigating measures-the Court's approach includes a substantially
smaller number of people within the reach of the ADA. 12 1 In another case,
the Court adopted an approach to "continuing violations" under Title VII
that rendered untimely many claims that the EEOC's standard would have
allowed. 122 By contrast, in the only case in which the Court explicitly
applied Chevron and deferred to the EEOC's regulations, the agency
regulation at issue was a more restrictive view of the disability statute than
the one the plaintiff was advocating. 123 Of course, this trend does have
exceptions, 124 but far more often the Court invalidates EEOC regulations
119. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
120. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
121. Sutton v. United States, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

122. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 & n.6, 111-13 (2002);
see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004) (rejecting the EEOC's
interpretive guidance providing that reverse discrimination claims were available under the
ADEA); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (rejecting an EEOC
interpretive guideline under the ADEA that gave plaintiffs a cause of action where an
employer plan drew distinctions among different age groups without specific economic
justification, and finding instead that such plans could only be challenged on a showing of
specific invidious intent).
123. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
124. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002); EEOC v. Commercial
Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986).
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and interpretive statements that support an expansive application of federal
antidiscrimination laws.
The historical evolution of the Court's cases discussing deference to the
EEOC also suggests a connection between substantive judgments about the
problem of discrimination and attitudes about the level of deference due the
Commission. Prior to 1976, the Court was extremely deferential to the
EEOC, never referring to any specific deference standard, but simply
stating that "[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing
authority is entitled to great deference."' 2 5 The Court's deference to the
agency in these earlier cases reflected both the Court's and the EEOC's
tendency to interpret Title VII broadly to effectuate its remedial
purposes. 12 6 In the second half of the 1970s, at about the same time that the
Court first adopted its less deferential stance towards the EEOC, there were
other indications of a growing concern among members of the Court that
antidiscrimination laws were being too expansively applied. 127 Moreover,
during this time the membership of the Court began to shift politically to
the right, and this shift in membership significantly altered the Court's
approach to antidiscrimination laws. 128 While the EEOC continued to
interpret Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws broadly, the Court
began to take a more limiting approach. The Court's more cabined
interpretation of the law was necessarily accompanied by a diminished
deference to the EEOC.
Many of the Court's decisions interpreting these major antidiscrimination
statutes and assessing what respect to give the EEOC's interpretations have
been sharply divided.129 While the majority in these cases generally prefers
both to restrict the reach of antidiscrimination laws and to limit deference to
the agency, the dissenters would give greater respect to EEOC
interpretations and also would generally prefer a more expansive reading of
the civil rights laws. This division-which links a substantive vision of
antidiscrimination laws to the power accorded the agency charged with
enforcing these laws--closely parallels the divisions in Congress over the
appropriateness of an empowered EEOC. As originally proposed by the
first supporters of the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC would have had
significant enforcement authority, which would have "assured that the
agency would be able to implement federal policies in the civil rights area
125. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); see also McDonald v.

Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 431 (1975); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).

126. See Eskridge, supra note 97, at 618-23 (describing the cooperative relationship
among the Court, Congress, and the executive in the early years of enforcing civil rights
laws).
127. For example, in 1977, the Court authored the first of two opinions cautioning against
overuse of class action litigation in discrimination cases. See E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc.
v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
128. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 97, at 623-36 (describing this rightward shift).
129. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999); EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 245 (1991); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
126 (1976).
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directly."' 130 Opponents of the agency, who were also opponents of the new
legislation more generally, argued that the EEOC would be too much an
advocate for plaintiff-employees. 13 1 The substitute bill, altered to win the
support of those legislators who were at best on the fence about the
proposed civil rights laws, weakened the EEOC considerably. 132 Thus,
both for members of Congress and for members of the Court, a strong
EEOC is directly linked to an expansive vision of civil rights laws. Given
this link, it seems entirely plausible that the Supreme Court's lack of
deference to the EEOC is motivated in part by political judgments about the
problem of discrimination.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM JUSTICE STEVENS

Whatever the reasons, the Court too often disregards the EEOC's
interpretations of the major statutes the agency is responsible for
implementing and enforcing. Some scholars have suggested that a solution
to this lack of respect lies in altering or applying the formal standards for
administrative deference so that the EEOC's interpretations are accorded
Chevron deference. 13 3 While applying this meaningful deference standard
to the agency's interpretations might lead the Court to accede to the
EEOC's views more often, I believe that the real problem is less the formal
deference standard applied to the agency's rules and regulations and more
the Court's underlying attitude towards the problem of discrimination and
its consequent lack of respect for the EEOC.
Justice Stevens's approach in this context is instructive. He very clearly
endorses the administrative deference structure that has been developed by
the Court, and he is also quite explicit in his view that the EEOC's most
common form of interpretation-interpretive guidance-should receive the
less deferential Skidmore review. 134 However, in applying that standard, he
gives the agency's interpretations the respect that even this less deferential
review standard demands. Thus, in both Arameco and Sutton, Justice
Stevens dissented, concluding that the EEOC's interpretations of Title VII
merited the Court's respect. 13 5 And, authoring the Court's opinion in its
130. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation,
151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1417, 1491 (2003).
131. See, e.g., White, supra note 31, at 59, 65.
132. Id.

133. See, e.g. Eskridge, supra note 97, at 681-82 (suggesting that perhaps Congress
should amend the civil rights laws to make explicit the agency's power to engage in
substantive rulemaking); White, supra note 4, at 574 (arguing that the EEOC's ADA
regulations and guidance are entitled to Chevron deference).
134. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.9

(2003); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 582 n.2, 594-95 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
135. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 513 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 275-78 (1991) (Marshall, J.,

dissenting). Dissenting in Gilbert,Justice Stevens did not base his views on deference to the
EEOC, though he did note approvingly Justice William Brennan's defense of the EEOC's
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most recent case evaluating an EEOC regulation, Justice Stevens applied
the Skidmore standard in a manner that again acknowledged136the significant
respect due the agency's carefully considered interpretation.
Justice Stevens has also recognized that the Court's rejection of EEOC
interpretation comes at the expense of the major federal antidiscrimination
laws' remedial goals. Dissenting in Sutton, Justice Stevens observed that
the Court's tendency to "chart its own course-rather than to follow the one
that has been well marked by... the Executive officials charged with the
responsibility of administering the ADA" led to a "crabbed vision of the
territory covered by this important statute." 137 The application of
administrative deference standards is just one context in which courts apply
purportedly neutral legal principles in ways that actually reflect important
By acknowledging the connection between
substantive judgments.
deference and a particular substantive vision of civil rights legislation,
Justice Stevens helps force to light this subtle but significant hobbling of
antidiscrimination law.

interpretive authority. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
136. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448-51.
137. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 513.

